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THE CORPORATE PARTNER

THE CORPORATE PARTNER
By ScoTT RowLEY*

T

problem relating to the power of a corporation to enter
into a partnership or to subject itself to partnership rights
and liabilities with an association or an individual becomes of
increasing importance as the number of corporations becomes
greater and as business technique becomes more involved. At
times it may become acute.
It is a generally conceded principle of corporation law that a
corporation has such powers, and such powers only, as are given
to it by the state. These rights may be given expressly or by
necessary implication." If, then, the corporation may be a
partner, this power does not accrue by reason of an inherent right
to be a partner, but by reason of a particular grant, expressly or
impliedly given by sovereign authority. There being nothing inherently illegal2 in such a relation, it is clear that this right, if
not prohibited by constitutional limitations, may be granted by
legislative action. This principle is recognized and approved in
the Uniform Partnership Act.2
The only obstacle to corporate capacity for the partnership
relation is the principle of ultra vires. No difficulty is encountered
when a constitutional statute expressly and unambiguously meets
the situation. If such a statute expressly authorizes corporations to enter into partnerships which promote their general purposes, such a relation is clearly permissible. 4 If. on the other
hand, such a statute expressly forbids such a relation, then it
HE

*Professor of Law, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.
'Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., (1891) 139 U. S.
24, 11 Sup. Ct. 478, 35 L. Ed. 55; Converse v. Emerson, T. & Co., (19091
242 Ill. 619, 90 N. E. 269; Atty. Gen. v. N. Y. N. H. & H. Ry., (1908)
197 Mass. 194, 83 N. E. 408; Schwab v. E. G. Potter Co., (1909) 19.4
N. Y. 409, 87 N. E. 670.
-Hackett v. Multnomah Ry., (1885) 12 Or. 124, 6 Pac. 659; NewzReg. Co. v. Rockingham Pub. Co., (1915) 118 Va. 140, 86 S. E. 874.
-'Sec.2, cl. 1 and 3. "In this Act... 'Person' includes individuals.
partnerships, corporations and other associations." Sec. 6, cl. 1. "A
partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit."
4
Butler v. Am. Toy Co., (1878) 46 Conn. 136; Breinig v. Sparrow,
(1907) 39 Ind. App. 455, 80 N. E. 37.
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is apparent that no attempt to establish such a relation can be
effectual.5 In either case the result is certain.
The real difficulties, both theoretically and factually, occur in
one of two ways. First, when the statutes do not expressly
authorize or forbid such a relation, thus raising the question of
implied authority. Second, when, by statute or by judicial decision, corporate power to enter a partnership is forbidden, but,
having been attempted, the rights and liabilities of the corporation
in the partnership affairs are involved, not as a partner, but tnder
other bases of rights and liabilities.
In the first problem, where the statutes do not expressly provide for the situation, there are two possible arguments favoring
denial of the power. The first is, that the partnership relation
is so foreign to the nature and general customs of corporations
that it is not to be presumed to be necessary to the carrying out
of the express powers of the corporation, that a partnership and
a corporation are incongruousY This reason does not seem
convincing. It may show that, as a rule, a corporation may not
find a partnership relation necessary to carry out successfully
the objects of its incorporation: but, after all, the necessity and
congruity are, in reality, matters for factual determination, tinder
the particular circumstances of each case. The tendency of the
courts is to enlarge rather than to restrict the scope of implied
powers.7

A much more difficult problem presents itself when the questions of legislative intent and public policy are interposed. Assume
that, in a particular case, it becomes essential, or at least beneficial and convenient, to a full exercise of expressly granted corporate powers, that the corporation enter into partnership relations with an individual or an association. What, if any, iniplication arises as to legislative intent?s On the one hand, it is
'Pittsburgh Rys. v. Pittsburgh, (1910) 226 Pa. St. 498, 75 At!. 681.
cMallory v. Hananer Oil Works, (1888) 86 Tenn, 598, 8 S. \V. 396:
People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834.
Franz v. Wim. Barr Dry Goods Co., (1908) 132 Mo. App. 8. 1i1 S. W.
636; Boyd v. Am. Carbon-Black Co., (1897) 182 Pa. St. 206, 37 At. 937.
7Koehler & Co. v. Reinheimer, (1898) 26 App. Div. 1, 49 N. Y. S.
755. 8
in the construction of charters and of articles and other instrunments of incorporation, the primary object is to find and to make effective the intention of the legislature and of the incorporators. insofar
as is possible. See Union Nat'l Bank v. Matthews, (1878) 98 IT.S.
621, 25 L. Ed. 188; Boston & L. Ry. Corp. v. Salem & L. Ry., (1854)
2 Gray (Mass.) 1; White v. Syracuse & U. R. R., (1853) 14 Barb.
(N.Y.) 559; Whetstone v. Ottawa Univ., (1874) 13 Kan. 339.
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claimed that the legislatures have very generally expressly provided that a corporation shall be managed, as to certain powers,
by its stockholders, and, as to certain other powers, by a board
of directors who shall be chosen by the stockholders, and still
other powers shall be exercised by other officers of the corporation, and that, by the generally accepted rules of partnership law,
there is a mutual agency whereby each partner may bind and
may be bound by every other partner, aside from contractual
restriction known by third parties. By reason of this situation,
it is claimed that the corporation may be bound by persons or
associations not contemplated by law, and that this situation precludes any presumption of legislative intent to imply an author0
ity contravening such positive management provisions.
This theory has been adhered to by the great majority of the
courts, but its logical application may well be questioned. The
inherent nature of the corporation necessarily implies that all its
acts must be performed by agents. It has neither physique nor
mentality by means of which it may act in person. Certain
agency functions are lodged in the stockholders as a group, others
in directors. Officers of the corporation may bind it in various
matters. The same may be true as to mere agents. 0 If a corporation may appoint a stranger as its agent to bind it in contract or
in tort, or even to act as general manager, why is it beyond
comprehension that it may appoint the other partners, in a partnership of which it is a member, to be such agents?
Is it true that there are certain elements of an agency through
partnership that differ from those of an ordinary agency? As
stated in one case:"'

"If a corporation be a member of a partnership, it may be
bound by any other member of the association, and in doing so
he would act, not as an officer or agent of the corporation, and
by virtue of authority received from it, but as a principal in an
association in which all are equal, and each capable of binding
the society by his acts. The whole policy of the law creating
and regulating corporations looks to the exclusive management
of the affairs of each corporation by the officers provided for or
9
Fechteler v. Palm Bros. & Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1904) 133 Fed.
462; Salem, etc., Ass'n v. Mc*Mahon, (1915) 78 Or. 477, 153 Pac. 788;
Dong You v. Wing Hing Co., (1915) 22 Hawaii 660; Gunn v. Central
Ry., (1885)
74 Ga. 509.
0
Mallory v. Hananer Oil Works, (1888) 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W. 396.
"Mallory v. Hananer Oil Works, (1888) 86 Tenn. 598. 8 S. W. 396.
See also, Whittenton Mills v. Upton, (1858) 10 Gray (Mass.) 582, 71
Am. Dec. 681.
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authorized by its charter. This management must be separate and
exclusive, and any arrangement by which the control of the
affairs of the corporation should be taken from its stockholders
and the authorized officers and agents of the corporation would
be hostile to the policy of our general incorporation acts."
A fallacy of this argument lies in the assumption of a false
premise. A partner of a corporation would be an agent of
the corporation by virtue of authority received from the corporation in the articles of copartnership. In any partnership, the
authority of one member to bind the other members is an agency
granted by each one to each other one. The mere contract of
partnership, without restriction, in itself gives this authority.
Moreover, the management of the corporation, as is shown elsewhere herein,' 12 need not be separate and exclusive, and there
may be, in some instances, an arrangement by which the control
of the corporation may be taken from such stockholders and
authorized officers and agents of the corporation as are contemplated by the court in the above case.
It is contended that such elements of partnership agency as
may differ from ordinary agency are logically immaterial to the
subject under discussion. It may be argued that an ordinary
agency is revocable at any time. But a partnership may be
dissolved at any time, and in the case of a partnership at will the
non-applicability of the reason for lack of the power under discussion can hardly be denied." The same is true in a limited
partnership, where the corporation might be the sole general
partner. It may be further argued that an ordinary agent may
be directed and controlled or discharged by the principal, and that
real control is in the firm. To a certain extent this is true as to
agency between partners.' 4 It is not universally true in non-partnership agency, as some forms of agency may be irrevocable."'
There are some outstanding instances where the management
and control of the corporate business have been, or may be,
"2See notes 16 and 17.
"Allen v. Woonsocket Co., (1876) 11 R. I. 288.
14A partner's agency may be limited by agreement as between tile
partners, and as to third parties who have knowledge of the agreement.
See, Shackleford v. Williams, (1913) 182 Ala. 87, 62 So. 54: Thomas
v. Hardsocg, (1908) 137 Iowa 597, 115 N. W. 210; Feigenspan v.
McDonnald, (1909) 201 Mass. 341, 87 N. E. 624; Uniform Partnership
Act, sec. 9 (4).
"SHunt v. Rousmanier's Admrs., (1823) 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 174, 5
L. Ed. 589.
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surrendered by the corporation. At this point it may be well to
consider that there is a distinct difference between management
of the corporation itself, and management of its business. Internal organization might readily be restricted to members. Even
this internal organization, however, under certain conditions,
may be surrendered. There are several outstanding instances
where this has been done, either without challenge or where
the power has been upheld by the courts; in some instances with
legislative sanction, at other times without statutory authority.'0
The instances cited in the footnote of such a practice of corporations without an enabling statute and without judicial sanction
do not, of course, establish their own validity, but they are at
least significant signs of the belief in their effectiveness and of
an economic and business need therefor. The statutes authorizing such a practice at least negative any public policy which
makes necessary an exclusive internal management of the corporation or of its business, at all times and under all circumstances
and conditions. Moreover, there is a negative power of control
and management, expressed in restrictive clauses in mortgages
and other security devices, which is almost uniformly recognized
by the courts and which is even more indicative of public policy.
Instances may also be given where corporations, as a device
for securing creditors, have surrendered management of the
whole business to these creditors, or have surrendered certain
powers of management of their affairs."
bGA striking instance of such surrender of a management power.
without challenge or legislative authority, is shown in the financial
structure of The United States Shipbuilding Company, (See M-jody,
The Truth About Trusts 359 et seq.) where a certain large bond issue
authorized a voting power in those bonds, equal to the same amount of
stock. This practice, with variations, is shown in other bonds. Two
issues of the Erie Railroad Company (First Consolidated Prior Lien
Gold 4s, dated Dec. 10, 1895, and the First Consolidated Gen. Lien Gold
4s of the same date) provided that each one thousand dollars of these
bonds should 'be entitled to ten votes at stockholders' meetings. The
5% income bond issue of the Chicago, Terra Haute & S. E. Ry. Co.
is another instance of voting bonds.
In some instances voting by creditors has been recognied by
statute. Ohio has had a statute (Page's Code of 1921, sec. 9079 et sel.)
authorizing, in certain railroad re-organizations, the voting by creditors with stockholders. The statutes of Iowa, (Code of 1927 Sec.
7930) and of New Jersey, (Comp. Stat. of 1916. sec. 5. p. 4241) provide
for voting by bondholders, under certain conditions, in railroad corporations. Delaware, (Rev. Code of 1915. sec. 29, p. 930) and Virginia
(Gen. Laws of 1923, sec. 3808) extend this power, under certain limitations, 7 to bondholders, in any corporation.
2 The 4% Refunding 100 year Gold Bonds of the Metropolitan
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A legislative act is commonly accepted as a declaration of public
policy. 1 Surely there is no public policy that there must be,
under all circumstances and conditions, a complete retention and
control by the corporation of exclusive powers of management
of its business, even to the denial of a right of appointment (by
partnership relation or otherwise) of agents with powers to incur
certain liabilities for the corporation, and so to carry out the
purpose of the acts of incorporation. There is, on the other
hand, a presumption that the legislature intends its grant of
corporate powers to be effective and that certain unenumerated
powers are to be implied, if they are necessary or convenient to
the accomplishment of expressly granted powers, and do not
contravene public policy or positive law.
There is a minor list of authorities, more logical than the
majority, that hold, in accord with this latter theory, that such
power may be impliedly granted. 19
In one case in particular, where a bank was compelled to take
over a pledged stock of goods in the collection of a debt due
to the bank, it was held that there was a power in the bank to
enter into a partnership with the former owner, to operate the
business for the purpose of realizing on the security, at least to
20
the extent of the property put into the business by the bank.
This brings us to a consideration of the situation in those
jurisdictions where the corporation is held to be incapable of beStreet Railway Company (of New York) were made subect to a provision that, upon certain defaults on the part of the company, a trustee
could enter in and operate the railway and the premises. The West
India Sugar Finance Corporation, a Connecticut corporation, has had
a peculiar system of securing control, either in the management of
debtor corporations, or of the business of such other corporations.
The principal business of this corporation was the financing of sugar
companies in the West Indies. It secured a measure of control over
these debtor corporations, not through stock ownership, but sometimes
by taking complete management of the property of these other corporations, and in other instances it placed one or more representatives
on the board of directors. It also had contracts with the other corporations, providing that capital expenditures and the payment of
dividends should rest with the finance corporation.
Sec. 30, p. 955, Maine, R. S. expressly authorized trustees for bondholders in railroad corporations, upon default in payments on bonds, and upon
an affirmative vote of the bondholders, to take over the railroad, with
all the powers and obligations of the directors and of the corporation.
s1In re Lampson's Will, (1898) 33 App. Div. 49, 53 N. Y. S. 531.
19Butler v. American Toy Co., (1878) 46 Conn. 136; and see, Catskill Bank v. Gray. (1851) 14 Barb. (N.Y.) 479.
2OSnow Hill Bkg. Co. v. D. J. Odom Drug Co., (1924) 188 N. C.
672, 125 S. E. 394.

And see 9 Minnesota Law Review 381.
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coming a partner. Is a corporation, by reason of this theory, in
attempting partnership relations, insulated from any rights or
liabilities growing out of such an attempt to establish such forbidden relation? As in other ultra vires contracts, it is not
necessarily true that, because the attempted contract does not
establish the attempted relation, no rights or liabilities attach to
the corporation. The remedy pursued and the question whether
the act contemplated is executory, executed or partly executory
and partly executed must be taken into consideration. The
element of estoppel also becomes material. There is a wide
difference between liability as a partner and liability as if a
partner.
Even in a jurisdiction where partnership relations are held to
be ultra vires, it is hardly conceivable, in a business venture
between a corporation and others, where there would be a partnership were the relation not ultra vires of the corporation, and
where the business was fully completed and the proceeds divided,
that a court would generally give any affirmative relief to either
party in an action to secure all the benefits of the transaction,
merely on the ultra vires aspect of the case"- even though in
such a jurisdiction a court of equity, in an action for specific
performance, might deny relief where the contract was wholly
executory. In case the contract was wholly executory on one
side and wholly executed on the other, the courts are divided
on the question of allowing the one receiving the benefits to
repudiate the contract,'with perhaps the better reasoned line of
authorities refusing to permit this practice.
In view of the vague line of demarcation between partnerships
and joint adventures, it is a peculiar but significant fact that a
corporation, although not considered, by the weight of authority, to have capacity to enter into a partnership, without statutory
authority therefor, may, nevertheless, enter into joint adventures
with others for any transactions which are not, in themselves,
ultra vires of the corporation, even though partnership liability
is thereby incurred by the corporation.22 And the mere joint
2lBoyd v. Amer. Carbon-Black Co., (1897) 182 Pa. St. 206, 37 Atd.
937.

-2 Salem-Fairfield Tel. Ass'n v. MccMahan, (1916) 78 Or. 477, 153
Pac. 788; Clinchfield Fuel Co. v. Henderson Iron Works Co., (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1918) 254 Fed. 411; Quitman Oil Co. v. McRee, (1916) 18 Ga.
128, 88 S. E. 921; Mestier v. A. Chevalier Pay. Co., (1901) 118 La. 562,
32 So. 520.
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interest growing out of an attempted partnership has been held
sufficient to bind corporations to liability therefor.22 It would
appear that a somewhat arbitrary rule, denying partnership capacity to a corporation, has been quite generally recognized by
the courts, as a matter of stare decisis, but that they, realizing its
defects in many instances, have seized upon various devices to
evade its effective operation whenever occasion has urgently demanded. The recognition by some courts of the power of a
corporation to enter into joint adventures, while at the same
time recognizing the rule that precludes the partnership relation,
is such a subterfuge.
A joint adventure has been termed "an association of two or
more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit."24
Certain jurisdictions point out minor distinctions between a partnership and a joint adventure, but the common and principal one
seems to be merely that the joint adventure is limited to one
transaction rather than to a series of transactions. However, a
2
partnership may be confined to a single transaction. 5
In view of this situation, it is obvious that, in most jurisdictions,
a distinction relating to the problem under discussion herein,
which is based upon the difference between a partnership and a
joint adventure is largely one of terminology, and obviously a
mere subterfuge. Even where a difference betwyeen a partnership
and a joint adventure is recognized at all, it has been held that
the relations are very similar,20 and that they are governed by
2
practically the same rules of law. ?

23

French v. Donohue, (1882) 29 Minn. 111, 12 N. NV. 354; N. Y.
& S. Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, (1831) 7 Wend. (N.Y.) 412; Wilson v.
Carter Oil Co., (1899) 46 W. Va. 469, 33 S.E. 249.
24
Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 975. See, Goss v.
Lanin, (1915) 170 Iowa 61, 152 N. W. 43; Felbel v. Kahn, (1898) 29
App. Div. 270, 51 N. Y. S.435. Compare, Pollock, Partnership. llth
ed., pp. 6, 7.
25

Spencer v. Jones, (1899) 92 Tex. 516, 50 S. NV. 118; Cochran v.

Anderson Co. Nat'l Bank, (1884) 83 Ky. 36.
2-Slater v. Clark & Co., (1896) 68 Ill.
App. 433; Irvine v. Campbell, (1913) 121 Minn. 192, 141 N. V. 108; Doane v. Adams & Co.,
(1860) 15 La. Ann. 350.
27
Hulett v. Fairbanks, (1883) 40 Ohio St. 233; Goss v. Lanin, (1915)
170 Iowa 61, 152 N. V. 43. Ross v. Willett, (1894) 76 1-un 211. 27
N. Y. S. 785; Church v. Odell, (1907) 100 Minn. 98, 110 N. \V. 340;
Marston v. Gould, (1877) 69 N. Y. 220.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A perusal of the cases seems to indicate that a majority have
held that, without express statutory sanction, a corporation has no
authority to become a partner, that there is no implied authority
therefor' which arises from necessity or convenience in carrying
out the express powers granted to the corporation, and that a main
reason therefor is to be found in the usual provisions of corporation statutes implying an internal control of each corporation,
which would be surrendered by entering into a partnership where
other partners could control, or at least bind, the corporation.
Certain statutes have been cited, however, which seem to negative any universal public policy that the corporation and its business must, under all circumstances, be internally managed. It
has also been shown that, in many instances, outside control has
been permitted, without express statutory authority, but without
objection, contest, or judicial determination. Even the cases
denying the power of a corporation to become a partner without
express authority do not generally deny its power and right to
become a joint adventurer, in a very similar association, with
partnership liability and with practically all the basic reasons
against such a relationship as may be found in a partnership.
Furthermore, many of these cases concede that, even though a
corporation cannot become a partner, it may, in many instances,
assume partnership liability as if a partner, by estoppel or otherwise.
The cases denying partnership capacity are founded upon a
narrow, illogical and somewhat obsolete philosophy and viewpoint. The theory became established when there was a popular
and legislative antipathy toward the corporation, indicating a
legislative intent to preclude any large measure of implied powers.
At that period, owing to the comparatively small number and size
of corporations, it is possible that there was an uncertainty as to
the advisability of the corporate form of business association,
which, in itself, created a public policy of a very real importance
against any extended implication of corporate powers at that time.
At the present time this situation has changed. The corporation has justified itself as a means of business association. It has
become greatly extended, both as to size and in numbers. Its
implied powers have increased. No longer does its very newness
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imply a public policy or a legislative intent to unduly restrict implied powers, provided these implied powers are not opposed to
positive law, and are necessary or convenient in the furtherance
of its express powers. A lack of public policy against such implied powers is indicated in the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act.
The subterfuges employed by the courts to give the corporation many of the rights and to impose upon it many of the liabilities that it would have were the true partnership permissible indicate an antipathy on the part of the courts to the rule denying
partnership capacity to a corporation. Moreover, the fact that
a small minority of the cases have conceded the right of a corporation to enter into real partnership relations, with alhi of the
rights and liabilities of any partners, even without express statutory authority therefor, shows an increasing policy, based upon
business needs and a more rational method of approach by these
courts, to adopt more direct and sensible rules for the determination of the problem under discussion.

